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DUE PROCESS IN CIVIL FORFEITURE CASES IN
WASHINGTON AFTER TELLEVIK v. REAL PROPERTY
Zhihong Pan
Abstract: In Tellevik v. Real Property, the Washington Supreme Court held that the
government's seizure of real property through an ex parte proceeding complied with the due
process requirements of the federal Constitution. This Note examines the Tellevik decision in
light of United States Supreme Court case law on procedural due process and lower federal
court rulings in real property forfeiture cases. It argues that the Tellevik court, in reaching its
decision, misapplied federal case law and concludes that due process requires an opportunity
for a full hearing before the government can deprive an owner of real property.

Is a property owner always entitled to a hearing before the
government can seize his or her real property? The Washington
Supreme Court answered in the negative. In Tellevik v. Real Property,' a
Washington state drug task force found a marijuana growing operation
on real property and applied ex parte for a warrant to seize the property.2
The Washington Supreme Court held that seizure of real property
probable cause proceeding satisfies the requirements
through an ex parte
3
of due process.
This Note argues that the Tellevik court reached its decision through
flawed analysis and application of federal due process standards, and
concludes that due process requires an opportunity for a full evidentiary
hearing before real property can be seized. Part I provides a general
survey of federal case law regarding due process in forfeiture seizure
proceedings involving real property and a description of the Tellevik
decision. Part II critiques the Washington Supreme Court's decision in
Tellevik on two grounds. First, the court improperly interpreted the
relevant United States Supreme Court cases involving procedural due
process before deprivation of an owner's property interest. Second, the
court wrongly applied the balancing test set out in the Supreme Court
case law to the present case. This Note suggests that the Tellevik court
should have distinguished between real property and personal property,
and concludes that courts should read into the Washington forfeiture
statute a requirement of a predeprivation hearing.

1. 120 Wash. 2d 68, 838 P.2d 111 (1992).
2. Id. at 73, 838 P.2d at 113.
3. Id. at 87, 838 P.2d at 121.
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I.

FEDERAL LAW ON PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN
FORFEITURE SEIZURE CASES AND TELLEVI7K v. REAL
PROPERTY

A.

Due ProcessAnalysis of ForfeitureSeizure Statutes by Federal
Courts

The United States Supreme Court has never addressed procedural due
process in the context of real property forfeiture. However, the Court has
extended due process protection to prejudgment seizure of personal
property in civil cases. In addition, the majority of lower federal courts
that have considered the issue have required a pre-seizure evidentiary
hearing in civil forfeiture cases involving real property.
1.

United States Supreme Court Rulings on ProcedvralDue Process

Even though the Supreme Court has never addressed the issue of
procedural due process in the context of real property forfeiture,4 the
Court's decisions involving prejudgment seizure of personal property
provide an analytical framework for deciding real estate forfeiture cases
and courts continue to look to these cases for guidance. In four decisions
handed down between 1969 and 1975, 5 the Court expanded the range of
property interests protected by federal due process to include temporary
deprivations of personal property resulting fiom prejudgment
proceedings.6 Recently, the Court reaffirmed its position that due
process requires a hearing before the government can deprive an owner
of personal property.
In Fuentes v. Shevin,7 the Court held unconstitutional Florida and
Pennsylvania prejudgment replevin statutes' that did not provide for

4. Id. at 79, 838 P.2d at 117.
5. North Ga. Finishing v. Di-Chem, 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S.
600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337
(1969).
6. For an insightful review of the ramifications of these cases, see Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind
of Hearing,123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975).
7. 407 U.S. 67 (1972). One of the property owners in this case was the purchaser of several
consumer goods on an installment payment plan. After the buyer failed to make timely payments,
the seller applied, ex parte, to the court for a writ of replevin pursuant to a Florida statute. Id. at
70-72.
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notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to attachment of property.9
The Court reiterated its long-standing position that due process requires
that "the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard 'must be granted
at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."" ° The Court further
required that the hearing must be granted at a time when the deprivation
can still be prevented." The Court also mentioned "extraordinary
situations" that may justify postponing the hearing." These situations,
however, must be truly unusual. 13 Absent such exigent circumstances,
due process requires that the property owner have a prior hearing. 4
5 the plaintiff, whose social security disability
In Mathews v. Eldridge,"
benefits had been terminated, challenged the constitutional validity of the
administrative procedures for assessing the existence of a continuing
disability. 6 The Court laid out a three-pronged balancing test to
determine whether the requirement of due process has been satisfied, and
considered the following interests.
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
7
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.'

8. See id. at 96. The replevin statutes required only that the applicant file a complaint, initiate a
court action for repossession, recite in a conclusory fashion that he or she is "lawfully entitled to the
possession" of the property, and file a security bond. Id. at 74.
9. Id. at 70.
10. Id. at 80 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545,552 (1965)).
11. Id. at 81.
12. Id. at90.
13. Id. The Court identified three elements of an "extraordinary situation": first, the seizure is
intended to secure an important governmental or general public interest; second, there is a special
need for very prompt action; third, the state keeps strict control over its monopoly of legitimate
force. Id. at 91. Examples of "extraordinary situations" include tax collection, national war effort,
bank failure, misbranded drugs, and contaminated food. Id. at 92.
14. Id. at 96-97 (quoting Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 343 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
15. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
16. Id. at 324-25. Based upon a questionnaire completed by the plaintiff, the state agency
determined that he had ceased to be disabled. The Social Security Administration then terminated
his benefits. Id. at 324.
17. Id. at 335.
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Applying the test, the Mathews Court first determined that the sole
private interest involved was in the uninterrupted receipt of the disability
income pending a final administrative decision on the recipient's claim. 8
Second, while conceding that the hardship imposed upon a disability
recipient whose benefits are erroneously terminated may be significant,
the Court nonetheless found that the potential value of an evidentiary
hearing was substantially less in this case than in welfare cases. 9
Finally, the Mathews Court found that the government's interest in
conserving scarce fiscal and administrative resources was significant
given the unique nature of the administrative process.20 On balance, the
Court concluded that an evidentiary hearing was not required prior to the
termination of disability benefits."
Most recently, in Connecticut v. Doehr,22 the Supreme Court applied
the Mathews balancing test to determine the validity of a Connecticut
attachment statute. In Doehr, a tort claim plaintiff ' applied, ex parte, to
a Connecticut superior court for a prejudgment attachment of Doehr's
home, pursuant to the Connecticut prejudgment attachment statute.24
First, the Court found that the private property interests were significant
because attachment clouds title, impairs the ability to alienate the
property, taints any credit rating, and reduces the chance of obtaining a
home equity loan or additional mortgage?2
Second, the Court
determined that the risk of erroneous deprivation was substantial. 26 The
18. Id. at 340. Without elaborating on the issue, the Court implied that the private interest was not
significant because eligibility for disability benefits is not based upon financial need. Id.
19. Id. at 342-45. The Court based its conclusion upon the finding that the agency's decision
whether to discontinue disability benefits would turn, in most cases, upcn routine, standard, and
unbiased medical reports by physicians. Id. at 344. The Court's decision was further influenced by
the built-in safeguards in the administrative procedure. First, the questionnaire which the agency
periodically sent the recipient identified with particularity the information relevant to the entitlement
decision; second, the recipient was invited to the local agency office for assistance; finally, the
recipient's representative had full access to all information relied upon by the agency. Id. at 343-44.
20. Id. at 347-48.
21. Id. at 349.
22. 111 S. Ct.2105 (1991).
23. The plaintiff sued Doehr in a civil action for assault and battery. Doehr, 111 S. Ct. at 2109.
24. See CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 52-278e(c) (1991). The statute authorized prejudgment attachment
of real estate without prior notice or hearing, without a showing of extraordinary circumstances, and
without a requirement that the person seeking the attachment post a bond. Doehr, 111 S. Ct. at 2109.
25. Id. at 2112-13. The Court refuted the state's argument that only complete and permanent
deprivation merits due process protection. To the contrary, the Court concluded that temporary or
partial impairments to property rights "are subject to the strictures of due process." Id. at 2113
(quoting Peralta v. Heights Medical Center, Inc., 485 U.S. 80, 85 (1988)).
26. Id. at2114.
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Court reasoned that since the tort claim was not prone to documentary
proof and the plaintiff's affidavit was based on conclusory statements,
the judge at the ex parte proceeding could make no realistic assessment
concerning the likelihood of an action's success.27 Third, the Doehr
Court concluded that the government's interest was minimal because the
suit involved a dispute between two private individuals.2" Weighing
these factors, the Court held that the Connecticut statute authorizing
attachment of real property without prior hearing and without a showing
of extraordinary circumstances violated due process.29
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.30 is the only Supreme
Court case on due process issues under drug forfeiture statutes. In
Calero-Toledo, the government seized a yacht that was subject to
forfeiture under a Puerto Rico statute.3 1 The Supreme Court permitted
outright seizure of the yacht with no prior notice or hearing based on
exigent circumstances.32 The Court reasoned that notice or a hearing
might frustrate the government interests because the property could be
removed to another jurisdiction, destroyed, or concealed, if advance
warning of confiscation were given.33 The Court concluded that the
seizure constituted
an "exigent circumstances" exception under
34
Fuentes.
2.

Rulings by Lower FederalCourts on Pre-SeizureNotice and
Hearing When Real PropertyIs Seized

The majority of federal courts that have considered the issue of
procedural due process in the context of real property forfeiture
proceedings have required an evidentiary hearing prior to the seizure.35
27. Id. The Court further noted that the statute does not provide adequate safeguards to reduce the
risk of erroneous deprivation. Id. at 2114-15.
28. Id. at2115.
29. Id. at 2109. For a good summary of the implications of Doehr, see Janice Gregg Levy,
Comment, Lis Pendens and ProceduralDue Process:A Closer Look After Connecticut v. Doehr, 51
MD. L. REV. 1054 (1992).
30. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
3 1. Id. at 665-68.
32. Id. at 679-80.
33. Id. at 679.
34. Id. at 679-80; see also United States v. Von Neumann, 474 U.S. 242, 251 (1986) (holding that
no pre-seizure hearing is required when customs officials make seizures at border).
35. The federal forfeiture statute is very similar to its Washington counterpart. Compare 21
U.S.C.A. § 881(a) (Vest 1981 & Supp. 1993) with WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.50.505 (West
Supp. 1992).
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According to these courts, the peculiar nature of real property generally
removes it from the "exigent circumstances" exception under Fuentes.
Courts that have applied the Mathews test have likewise concluded that
due process requires a prior hearing before seizure of real property.
In United States v. 4492 S. Livonia Rd.,36 the groverment sought
forfeiture of a 120-acre parcel of land with a house on it.37 The
government applied for and was granted a seizure warrant after an ex
parte proceeding before a magistrate.3 8 The property owner claimed that
the statute was unconstitutional because he was not afforded an
adversarial hearing prior to the seizure of his real property.39 The Second
Circuit held that due process generally requires a hearing prior to the
deprivation of property in the absence of "exigent circumstances."4'
Noting that a person's home, unlike some forms of property, cannot be
readily moved or dissipated, the Second Circuit concluded that preseizure notice and hearing would not frustrate the purpose of the
statute.4'
The Second Circuit recently extended its holding in Livonia to real
property used for business purposes. In United States v. All Assets of
Statewide Auto Parts, Inc.,42 the government seized an auto parts
business allegedly engaging in money-laundering activities.43 Relying
on Livonia, the court held that the ex parte pre-seizure hearing was
unconstitutional.' The court reasoned that the private interest at stake in
the case was significant because the entire business was shut down.45 In
contrast, the government's narrow interest was in obtaining pre-notice
seizure of a fixed item like a home, not the broad interest in enforcing the
laws, since the latter would also be served by forfeiture after an
adversarial proceeding. 46 Therefore, the court concluded that the
balancing of the Mathews factors favored a prior hearing.

36. 889 F.2d 1258 (2d Cir. 1989) [hereinafterLivonia].
37. Id. at 1260. The government pursued its action under 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(a)(7) (West Supp.
1993), which makes real property subject to civil forfeiture. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1261.
40. Id. at 1265.
41. Id.
42. 971 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1992).
43. Id. at 899.
44. Id. at 905.
45. Id. at 902.
46. Id. at 903 (quoting Livonia, 889 F.2d 1258, 1265 (2d Cir. 1989)).

950
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The Ninth Circuit similarly held in United States v. James Daniel
Good Property47 that seizing an owner's home without a pre-seizure
hearing violates due process.48 The court noted that, under due process
analysis, real property is distinct from personal property because the
owner cannot remove real property from the jurisdiction as it could
personal property. 9 The court found that the owner's substantial and
unique interest in a home outweighed the government's interest in
avoiding a pre-seizure hearing.' ° Thus, the home owner was entitled to
an opportunity to be heard before a home was seized.5
Some federal courts have allowed seizure of real property in the
forfeiture context without prior notice or hearing. In United States v. 900
Rio Vista Blvd,52 the Eleventh Circuit, in a cursory treatment of the due
process issue, interpreted Calero-Toledo as holding that no prior judicial
determination is required when the government seizes items subject to
forfeiture.5 3 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit permitted seizure of homes
without a prior hearing. Similarly, in United States v. 26.075 Acres, 54 a
federal district court held that seizure of property subject to forfeiture is,
in itself, an extraordinary situation under Fuentes sufficient to postpone
notice and a hearing. 5
B.

Tellevik v. Real Property

The Washington Legislature adopted the Uniform Controlled
Substances Act in 1971.6 The Act covers the regulation and distribution
of controlled substances and the enforcement of penalties against
substance abuse. In 1988, the Legislature added real property to the list

47. 971 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1992), certgranted, 113 S. Ct. 1576 (U.S. Mar. 22, 1993).
48. Id. at 1384. In this case, the government obtained the seizure warrant through an ex parte
proceeding where the magistrate made the determination based on the affidavit of a law enforcement
officer. Id. at 1382.
49. Id. at 1383.
50. Id. The court reasoned that since the house was not going anywhere, any legitimate interest
the government had could be protected through means less restrictive than seizure. Id.
51. Id.
52. 803 F.2d 625 (1 lth Cir. 1986).
53. Id. at 632.
54. 687 F. Supp. 1005 (E.D.N.C. 1988), affd in part,sub nom. United States v. Santoro, 864 F.2d
1538 (4th Cir. 1989).
55. See also United States v. Certain Real Estate Property, 612 F. Supp. 1492, 1496 (S.D. Fla.
1985).
56. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.50.101-608 (West 1985).
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of property subject to forfeiture.57 Tellevik is the first Washington
Supreme Court case on due process issues in real property forfeiture.
Tellevik consolidated two forfeiture cases. In the first of the
consolidated cases, Tellevik v. 9209 218th N.E., the Washington State
Patrol executed a search warrant for a home on October 27, 1989, and
found a marijuana growing operation. 8 On April 6, 1990, Tellevik,
Chief of the Washington State Patrol, applied ex parte for a warrant of
arrest in rem. 9 The trial court refused to issue a warrant, interpreting
Washington Revised Code section 69.50.505(a)(8) to permit a seizure
only when the property is currently being used in violation of the
statute. 0 The Washington Court of Appeals denied the state's motion for
discretionary review and the trial court dismissed the suit.6
In the second case, Tellevik v. Real Property Known As 31641 West
Rutherford Street, the State Patrol executed a search warrant for a home
on September 26, 1989, and also found a marijuana growing operation. 62
On April 13, 1990, Tellevik filed a complaint for forfeiture in rem
against the real property under the same statute and was granted at an ex
parte proceeding a warrant to seize the property. 3 The owners of the
property then moved to challenge the constitutionality of the forfeiture
statute, whereupon the trial court quashed the warrant of arrest in ren.'
The state directly appealed to the Washington Supreme Court.65
57. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.50.505(a) (West Supp. 1992) providas in pertinent part:
(a) The following are subject to seizure and forfeiture and no property right exists in them:

(8) All real property, including any right, title, and interest in the whale of any lot or tract of
land, and any appurtenances or improvements which are being used with the knowledge of the
owner... in violation of this chapter... and a substantial nexus exists between the commercial
production or sale of the controlled substance and the real property ....
58. Tellevik v. Real Property; 120 Wash. 2d 68, 72-73, 838 P.2d 111, 113 (1992).
59. Id. at 73, 838 P.2d at 113. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.50.505(b) (West Supp. 1992)
provides in pertinent parts:
Real... property subject to forfeiture under this chapter may be seized by any board inspector
or law enforcement officer of this state upon process issued by any superior court having
jurisdiction over the property. Seizure of real property shall include the filing of a lis pendens by
the seizing agency.
(Emphasis added). The seizure of real property establishes in rem jurisdiction over the property.
60. Tellevik, 120 Wash. 2d at 73, 838 P.2d at 113.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
Id. at 74, 838 P.2d at 113-14.
Id. at 74, 838 P.2d at 114.
Id. at 74-75, 838 P.2d at 114.

65. Id. at 75, 838 P.2d at 114.
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The Washington Supreme Court held that section 69.50.505(b) was
not unconstitutional on its face or as applied.66 The Tellevik court
concluded that the Fuentes test of "exigent circumstances" did not apply
because the property owners were afforded a hearing prior to the
deprivation.67 According to the court, Fuentes requires only some kind
of hearing prior to deprivation.68 While conceding that a majority of
federal courts have required evidentiary hearings before the government
could seize homes,69 the Tellevik court determined that these federal
courts misinterpreted the interplay between Fuentes and Mathews.70 The
Tellevik court concluded that Fuentes does not apply where, as in this
case, an ex parte proceeding preceded the seizure. 7' The Tellevik court
reasoned that Fuentes is only relevant if no prior hearing of any type was
held.72
The Tellevik court then applied the Mathews balancing test and found
that while the private and governmental interests were significant in this
case, the risk of erroneous deprivation was slight given the documentary
nature of the bases of probable cause.73 First, the temporary impact on
the private interest of the temporary seizure of the home and the rental
property in these cases, while significant, was less than that of a
permanent or physical dispossession of the property.74 Second, the risk
of erroneous deprivation under the Washington forfeiture statute was
minimal because probable cause was based upon police affidavits after
valid searches which showed that "a substantial nexus exist[ed] between
the commercial production or sale of the controlled substance and the

66. Id. at 87, 838 P.2d at 121.
67. Id. at 85, 838 P.2d at 120.
68. Id. at 83, 838 P.2d at 119.
69. See supranotes 35-55 and accompanying text
70. Tellevil, 120 Wash. 2d at 83, 838 P.2d at 118. According to the Tellevik court, the Livonia
court misapplied Fuentes to the Mathews test by "assessing the strength of the government's
interest"
in terms of whether the "case presented exigent circumstances warranting the
postponement of notice and the opportunity for an adversarial hearing." Id.' (citing Livonia, 889
F.2d 1258, 1265 (2d Cir. 1989)).
71. Id. at 85, 838 P.2d at 120.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 87, 838 P.2d at 120.
74. Id. at 86, 838 P.2d at 120. According to the court, seizure of real property establishes only an
inchoate property interest in the seizing agency and does not allow the seizing agency to deprive the
occupants of physical possession. Id. at 85, 838 P.2d at 120. The court relied heavily on the fact
that claimants are entitled to a full adversarial hearing within 90 days if they contest the seizure
under WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 69.50.505(e). Id. at 86, 838 P.2d at 120.
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According to the court, the documented evidence
real property."'
provided an objective basis from which to determine whether the
standard in Washington Revised Code section 69.50.505(a)(8) had been
met.7" Finally, without elaborating on the issue, the Tellevik court
concluded that the government had a significant interest in seizing the
property to prevent its continued use for illegal activity, relying on the
legislative declaration that forfeiture provides a significant deterrent to
drug crimes.77
The majority opinion drew a vigorous dissent by Justice Johnson. He
argued that when exigent circumstances are absent, -the government's
interest in seizing real property through ex parte procedures must give
way to the property owner's interest. 78 Justice Johnson concluded that,
under the Mathews balancing test, a pre-seizure adversarial hearing was
required in the absence of exigent circumstances. 79 First, the real
property owner's interest was significant because the seizure intruded
Second, the ex parte procedures
upon property ownership rights."
created a considerable risk that real property would be erroneously seized
because real property forfeiture cases involve factual inquiries as to the
owner's knowledge of the illegal activities." Third, the government's
interest in seizing real property through ex parte procedures was minimal
because the government's interest in seizing property tc deter illegal drug
use will not be affected by requiring an adversarial healing rather than an
ex parte proceeding. 2
II.

CRITIQUE OF TELLEVIK v. REAL PROPERTY

The Tellevik court erred by deciding that federal due process did not
require a hearing before real property could be seized. The Tellevik court
drew erroneous conclusions from Fuentes and its progeny and wrongly

75. Id. at 86, 838 P.2d at 120.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 86-87, 838 P.2d at 120.
78. Id. at 93, 838 P.2d at 124 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 100, 838 P.2d at 128.
80. Id. at 95-96, 838 P.2d at 125.
81. Id. at 97, 838 P.2d at 126. According to the dissent, "knowledge issues are not 'ordinary
uncomplicated matters' susceptible to documentary proof; rather, they involve fact-intensive
determinations based on evaluating circumstantial evidence." Id. (citing Reardon v. United States,
947 F.2d 1509, 1519 (1st Cir. 1991)).
82. Id. at 98-100, 838 P.2d at 126-28. Justice Johnson also determined that requiring adversarial
pre-seizure hearings would not involve undue financial or administrative burdens. Id.
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applied the Mathews balancing test to the facts of the case. The Tellevik
court should have distinguished between personal property and real
property in determining what process is due in forfeiture cases. In light
of the Tellevik decision, the Legislature should amend the statute to
require a full evidentiary hearing.
A.

The Tellevik CourtDrew ErroneousInferencesfrom Fuentes

Contrary to the Tellevik court's assertions, Fuentes does not stand for
the proposition that only some kind of hearing is required under the due
process clause. Rather, Fuentes and its progeny require a full evidentiary
hearing, absent exigent circumstances, given at a meaningful time and at
a meaningful place so that the deprivation can still be prevented." The
Tellevik court assumed that an ex parte proceeding was a hearing for
purposes of due process analysis. This, however, is not what the Fuentes
Court intended because the statutes held unconstitutional in Fuentes
required ex parte hearings before attachment.8 4
The essence of due process is to provide the person whose property
interest is at risk with a hearing where a neutral official can make an
informed evaluation. 5 The purpose of the hearing is not for the
government to be heard, but for the person who is about to lose his or her
property to be heard. Accordingly, the Supreme Court in Fuentes did not
consider an ex parte proceeding a hearing for purposes of due process
analysis.8 6 However, in Tellevik, the property owners were not even
given an opportunity to be present at the ex parte proceeding, let alone
heard. Thus, the Tellevik court's holding cannot be reconciled with the
reasoning of the Fuentes line of cases.
The Tellevik court's holding also runs counter to the Supreme Court's
recent opinion in Doehr. In Doehr, the Court again held that an ex parte
proceeding before attachment of property violated the owner's due
process rights. 7 Like the statute in Fuentes, the statute in Doehr
required an ex parte proceeding prior to attachment.88 In concluding that
83. See supranotes 7-14 and accompanying text.
84. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 83 (1972); see supranotes 8-9 and accompanying text.
85. See Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 83.
86. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 324, 334 (1976) (stating that Fuentes requires something
more than an ex parte proceeding prior to attachment of property).
87. Connecticut v. Doehr, 111 S. Ct. 2105, 2116 (1991); see supra notes 22-29 and
accompanying text.
88. Doehr, II1 S. Ct. at 2110. The superior court judge made the probable cause finding on the
basis of the plaintiff 's affidavit. Id.
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due process requires a hearing before attachment, the Supreme Court
clearly referred to a full evidentiary hearing, rather than an ex parte
proceeding since there had been an ex parte proceeding prior to the
attachment of the property.89 The Livonia court applied the Fuentes
analysis in the forfeiture seizure context. 9 Hence, the Fuentes analysis
squarely applies to situations in which an ex parte proceeding precedes
the deprivation.
B.

The Tellevik Court Wrongly Applied the Mathews Balancing Test

The Tellevik court wrongly applied the Mathews balancing test to the
facts in the case. First, the property owners' interests were significant,
despite the temporary effect of seizure. Second, the risk of erroneous
deprivation under the Washington statute was substantial because the
facts in forfeiture proceedings are not readily susceptible to documentary
proof. Third, the government's interests were minimal. A balancing of
the three factors weighs in favor of a full evidentiary hearing.
1.

The Property Owners 'Interests Were Significant

In Tellevik, the property owners' interests were significant. By
characterizing the seizure as establishing an inchoate property interest
having less impact than that of a permanent or physical dispossession of
the property, the Tellevik court implied that such "temporary impact"
gave the property owners less constitutional protection.9 This position,
however, cannot be squared with the recent Supreme Court decision in
Doehr where the Court afforded due process protection to just such
"temporary impact" from a prejudgment attachment.92 Because real
property owners in both seizure and attachment cases suffer temporary
deprivation of property rights, the reasoning and analysis in Doehr
should also apply in forfeiture seizure cases. Therefore, the interests of

89. Id.
90. See supranotes 36-41 and accompanying text.
91. Tellevik v. Real Property, 120 Wash. 2d 68, 85-86, 838 P.2d 111, 120 (1992).
92. The Court reiterated that it "has never held that only such extreme deprivations trigger due
process concerns. To the contrary, our cases show that even the temporary or partial impairments to
property rights that attachment, liens, and similar encumbrances entail are sufficient to merit due
process protection." Doehr, 111 S. Ct. at 2113.

956
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real property owners in forfeiture cases are at least equally, if not more,
significant than in prejudgment attachment cases.9 3
Although the government in a forfeiture proceeding may enter into an
occupancy agreement with the property owners, allowing them to remain
in the house pending the forfeiture proceeding,' the seizure of the home
can substantially infringe upon owners' interests in privacy and other
rights. For example, an occupancy agreement may restrict the owner's
use of the property, render the owner liable for damages to the property,
and even provide for governmental entry and inspection. 95 Similarly, a
filing of a lis pendens clouds the title to the property by limiting the
owner's power to alienate the property. 96 Consequently, the effects of a
seizure and an attachment are virtually indistinguishable. Moreover, as
the Tellevik court conceded, a homeowner's expectation of privacy and
freedom from governmental intrusion merits special constitutional
protection.97 Therefore, the Tellevik court's attempt to downplay the
effect of seizure on real property owners' rights under the Mathews test
is not convincing.
2.

The SubstantialRisk ofErroneousDeprivation in ForfeitureCases
Favors a Pre-SeizureHearing

The Tellevik court's assertion that the risk of erroneous deprivation in
this case was minimal belies the reality of civil forfeiture cases. To seize
property under the Washington forfeiture statute, the government must
prove that the defendant knew of the illegal activity. However,
knowledge issues are generally not subject to documentary proof. Thus,
the risk of erroneous deprivation in an ex parte proceeding is substantial.
Further, that the government bears a low substantive standard of proof in
a forfeiture case, as compared to a criminal case, is more reason for
courts to provide real property owners with more procedural safeguards.
In addition, the forfeiture statute does not provide adequate immediate

93. Unlike attachment cases, real property owners under forfeiture seizure face possible eviction
by the government.
94. Tellevik 120 Wash. 2d at 86, 838 P.2d at 120. The rental property owners were also allowed
to continue to collect rent. Id.
95. In re Kingsley, 802 F.2d 571, 579 (1st Cir. 1986).
96. The filing ofa lis pendens is required by Washington Revised Code section 69.50.505(b). For
a detailed analysis of the effect of lis pendens on property rights, see Comment, supra note 29, at
1075.
97. Tellevik 120 Wash. 2d at 83, 838 P.2d at 119 (citing United States v. 4492 S. Livonia Rd.,
889 F.2d 1258, 1264 (2d Cir. 1989) which cites United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984)).
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post-seizure safeguards against erroneous deprivation. Therefore, the
second part of the Mathews test also weighs in favor of requiring a preseizure hearing in order to comply with the mandate or due process.
The Tellevik court's assertion that the probable cause issue concerns
"uncomplicated matters that lend themselves to documentary proof"98
runs counter to the requirements of the Washington forfeiture statute.
Under the Washington statute, the judge in a pre-seizure hearing must
make a finding that the defendants knew of the illegal activity.99 Yet,
knowledge issues are not "uncomplicated matters," such as the existence
of debt or payment delinquencies, that are susceptible to documentary
proof. Rather, they involve fact-intensive determinations based on
evaluating circumstantial evidence."ro Without a full evidentiary hearing
at which the defendants can assert defenses and cross-examine witnesses,
the granting of the government's request of a seizure is almost a foregone
conclusion."' The most effective way to minimize erroneous deprivation
is to use the adversary system to establish probable cause for seizure of
property.
The risk of erroneous deprivation under the Washington forfeiture
statute is substantial because of the low standard of proof required of the
government and lack of procedural protection offered. The forfeiture
statute requires the government to show only that a substantial nexus
exists between the property and the drug violation. ° The government
does not have to prove the nexus even by a preponderance of the
evidence and the government may show probable cause through rank
98. Tellevik, 120 Wash. 2d at 86, 838 P.2d at 120 (quoting Connecticut v. Doehr, 111 S.Ct. 2105,
2114 (1991) which quotes Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 609, (1974)).
99. Tellevikl 120 Wash. 2d at 97, 838 P.2d at 126 (Johnson J., dissenting). For the text of the
statute, see supra note 57.
100. Tellevik, 120 Wash. 2d at 97 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (citing Reardon v. United States, 947
F.2d 1509, 1519 (1st Cir. 1991)).
101. As the Doehr Court noted.
The likelihood of error that results illustrates that "fairness can rarely be obtained by secret,
one-sided determination of facts decisive of ights .... [And n]o better instrument has been
devised for arriving at truth than to give a person in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case
against him and an opportunity to meet it."
Doehr, III S. Ct. at 2114 (1991) (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341
U.S. 123, 170-72 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
102. For the text of the statute, see supra note 57. In forfeiture cases, federal courts have rejected
the accepted notion in criminal cases that the due process clause requires the government to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has committed the crime he or she is charged with.
See United States v. $2,500 in U.S. Currency, 689 F.2d 10, 12 (2d Cir. 1932) (upholding shifting of
burden in civil forfeiture of drug proceeds because in rem forfeiture is not criminal), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1099 (1984).
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hearsay. 10 3 Moreover, the government can seek criminal prosecution of
the property owner before, during, or after a civil forfeiture proceeding,
and courts have refused to find any resulting violation of the Fifth
Amendment prohibition on double jeopardy."° Finally, governments at
both the state level and the federal level may prosecute the property
owner in two separate proceedings.0 5 Given the egregious results of
forfeiture and the low constitutional protection afforded the property
owners in forfeiture trials, courts must provide the real property owners
with every procedural protection mandated by the Constitution. Indeed,
courts have voiced their concern and frustration at the government's
increasing and virtually unchecked use of the forfeiture statutes and the
disregard of due process buried in those statutes." 6 Therefore, requiring
a full evidentiary hearing prior to the seizure of real property serves as an
effective safeguard against erroneous deprivation by the government.
The Washington forfeiture statute contains inadequate post-seizure
safeguards against erroneous deprivation. Only where adequate postdeprivation procedural safeguards exist has the Supreme Court allowed
outright deprivation without a prior hearing. 7 However, no such
safeguards exist in the Washington statute. The Tellevik court interpreted
Washington Revised Code section 69.50.505(e) as requiring a full
adversarial hearing within ninety days if the owner contests the
seizure.'0 3 Yet, a closer look at the statute reveals that it contains no such
requirement. Although the statute provides that a person filing a claim
within ninety days shall be afforded a hearing, it does not set any time
limit for holding the hearing. 9 In courts with crowded civil calendars,
103. United States v. One 1986 Nissan Maxima GL, 895 F.2d 1063, 1064-65 (5th Cir. 1990); see
also United States v. $4,255,625.39, 762 F.2d 895 (11th Cir. 1985) (upholding forfeiture of alleged
drug proceeds on the basis of the sheer amount of money involved and the fact that the events took
place in Miami and the bank account was maintained by a corporation with Colombian affiliations),
cert. denied,474 U.S. 1056 (1986). But see United States v. $12,390.00, 956 F.2d 801, 812 (8th Cir.
1992) (Beam, J., dissenting in part) (arguing that the facts used by the government have to meet the
requirements of the federal rules of evidence). For a good summary of this area of the law, see
generally TJ. Hiles, Civil Forfeiture of Propertyfor Drug Offenders Under Illinois and Federal
Statutes: Zero Tolerance, Zero Exceptions, 25 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 389 (1992).
104. See, e.g., United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 362 (1984)
(holding that forfeiture actions following a criminal acquittal do not constitute double jeopardy).
105. United States v. All Assets of Statewide Auto Parts, Inc., 971 F.2d 896, 904 (2d Cir. 1992).
106. See, e.g., id at 905; see also United States v. 632-636 Ninth Avenue, 798 F. Supp. 1540,
1551 (N.D. Ala. 1992).
107. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600
(1974).
108. Tellevik v. Real Property, 120 Wash. 2d 68, 86, 838 P.2d 111, 121 (1992).
109. Washington Revised Code section 69.50.505(e) provides, in pertinent part:
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this portended safeguard may prove to be a nullity if the seizure hearing
is later combined with the hearing on the forfeiture action, since the
property owner has to respond to the seizure within ninety days or suffer
the risk of forfeiture by default."1 The end result is that these provisions
do not provide any immediate post-seizure safeguards against the
temporary deprivation of the property.
3.

The Tellevik Court Gave Improper Weight to the Government's
Interest

The Tellevik court failed to distinguish between the government's
general interest in fighting the war on drugs and its specific interest in
seizing real property without a prior hearing. Viewed from the latter
perspective, the government's interest in Tellevik is outweighed by that
of the real property owner. Moreover, the law enforcement agency's
built-in conflict of interest under the statute further diminishes the
government's interest.
Therefore, the court should require the
government to provide a full evidentiary hearing before seizing the
property under the Mathews balancing test.
There is no doubt that the government has a significant interest in
fighting the drug war. The issue here, howevei, is whether the
government achieves any significant public goal by denying a preseizure hearing for real property owners. The court failed to look at the
government's interest in affording the defendants a full hearing prior to
the seizure versus its interest in not so doing. The government's interest
in the seizure of the real property is that such a seizure serves to
commence the forfeiture proceeding.'
Viewed this way, the
government's interest is very limited, thus not significant."' The broad

If any person notifies the seizing law enforcement agency in writing of the person's claim of
ownership or right to possession of items specified in subsection... (a)(8) of this section within
...ninety days in the case of real property, the person or persons shall b- afforded a reasonable
opportunity to be heard as to the claim or right.
110. Real property forfeiture actions are initiated by the filing of a summons and complaint for
forfeiture. Besides, Washington Revised Code section 69.50.505(d) provides that:
If no person notifies the seizing law enforcement agency in writing of the person's claim of
ownership or right to possession of items specified in subsection... (a)(8) of this section within
...ninety days in the case of real property, the item seized shall be deemed forfeited.
111. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.50.505(c) (West Supp. 1992).
112. A great majority of federal courts that have considered the government's interest under the
Mathews balancing test have found that the government interest is limited to seizure without prior
hearing, not the government's general interest in the ultimate forfeiture of the property. See supra
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interest of the government in preventing and deterring drug dealing will
be served whether the seizure occurs before or after an adversarial
Therefore, the government has a limited interest in
proceeding.'
initiating the seizure proceeding." 4
Moreover, "the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail ' ' also militate in favor
of a full hearing before seizure of real property. The Due Process Clause
mandates an opportunity to be heard, not an actual hearing." 6 In the
present case, all the government has to do to comply with due process is
to give the real property owner notice and an opportunity to show up and
put forth a defense. Furthermore, if the government could wait for more
than six months before it started the seizure proceeding," 7 it certainly
could afford the property owners reasonable time to challenge the
government's deprivation. Thus, the government's interest here is
minimal while the additional burden on it to fulfill the promise of due
process under the Constitution is light.
The court should not overlook that law enforcement agencies stand to
gain directly from the forfeiture of property. Under Washington Revised
Code section 69.50.505(f), the seizing law enforcement agency may
retain the real property for its own use or sell the forfeited property to
cover the expenses of the government's investigation." 8 An ex parte
application for a seizure warrant tests no more than the government's
"own belief in its own rights."' 9 Since the government's self-interest is

note 46 and accompanying text; see also United States v. James Daniel Good Property, 971 F.2d
1376, 1384 (9th Cir. 1992) (concluding that the government's interest in avoiding a pre-seizure
hearing is not significant), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 1576 (U.S. Mar. 22, 1993); United States v.
Certain Real Estate Property, 612 F. Supp. 1492, 1497 (S.D. Fla. 1985) ("Public policy is not a
catch-all justification for shortchanging property owners of their due process protection under the

constitution." ).
113. United States v. Parcel I, Beginning at a Stake, 731 F. Supp. 1348, 1354 (S.D. IlL 1990).
114. As the dissent in Tellevik correctly points out, with an adversarial hearing, the state would
still be able to initiate forfeiture proceedings, provide a significant deterrent to drug trafficking, and
enhance revenue to partially defray crime control costs but, at the same time, protect the individual
homeowner from an erroneous deprivation of property rights. Tellevik v. Real Property, 120 Wash.
2d 68, 98, 838 P.2d 111, 127 (1992) (Johnson, J., dissenting).
115. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); see supranote 17 and accompanying text.
116. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,378-79 (1971).
117. Tellevik, 120 Wash. 2d at 72-74,838 P.2d at 113-14.
118. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.50.505(1).
119. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 84 (1972).
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at stake here, 2 ' the danger is substantial that the government's
confidence in its own cause could be misplaced.'
Thus, the
government's interest under the Mathews test is further diminished
because the government's action serves no significant public interest
while the law enforcement agency benefits directly from the deprivation.
C.

Courts Should DistinguishBetween Real PropertyandPersonal
Property

1.

Real PropertyIs FundamentallyDistinguishablein Terms of
Determining Whether Exigent CircumstancesExist

In forfeiture seizure proceedings involving real property, exigent
circumstances rarely exist to justify seizing real property without prior
hearing under Fuentes because real property, unlike personal property,
cannot be moved out of a court's jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit made
this distinction in United States v. James Daniel Good Property."
When real property is the subject of seizure, no prompt action is
necessary because the land is not going anywhere." Requiring a preseizure notification and an opportunity for a full hearing will not frustrate
the government's interest in asserting jurisdiction over the property.
24
Accordingly, the "exigent circumstances" analysis in Calero-Toledo
generally does not apply in real property seizure cases."2s Thus, in
forfeiture seizure cases, the court should treat real property as distinct

120. See United States v. 632-636 Ninth Avenue, 798 F. Supp. 1540, 1551 (N.D. Ala. 1992)
(arguing that law enforcement agencies have a "built-in" conflict-of-interast because they share in
the product of the seizure).
121. See Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 83.
122. 971 F.2d 1376, 1383 (9th Cir. 1992), certgranted,113 S. Ct. 1576 (U.S. Mar. 22, 1993); see
also Livonia, 889 F.2d 1258, 1263-65 (2d Cir. 1989).
123. James Daniel Good Property, 971 F.2d at 1384. The court reasoned that "[the home will
be there when the government decides to initiate forfeiture proceedings. The home will be there
when the government delivers notice of its intent. Finally, the home will still be there for seizure if
the government is successful on the merits of its action." Id. at 1383; cf Calero-Toledo v. Pearson
Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974). The Calero-Toledo Court placei heavy emphasis on the
mobility factor which the Court found to be an "extraordinary situation." Id. at 680.
124. See supranotes 30-34 and accompanying text.
125. Exceptions to this rule would exist where the real property is continuously used for illegal
purposes. Another example of an "exigent circumstance" would be where the owner tries to sell the
property. See Connecticut v. Doehr, 111 S. Ct. 2105, 2115 (1991) (concluding that the plaintiff 's
interest was minimal because there was no allegation that Doehr was about to make the property
unavailable to satisfy ajudgment).
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from personal property and afford real property owners an opportunity
for a prior hearing under due process.
2.

Legislative History Supports Drawinga DistinctionBetween Real
and PersonalProperty

When the Washington State Legislature added real property to the list
of property subject to forfeiture in 1988,26 it provided real property
owners more protection from seizure and forfeiture than personal
property owners. First, in cases involving personal property the burden
of production is on the property owner, while in cases involving real
property the burden of production as well as the burden of persuasion are
on the law enforcement agency.'27 Second, the statute gives personal
property owners forty-five days to petition for a hearing on the merits,
but ninety days for real property owners. 8 Finally, the Legislature is
very much aware of the severity of real property seizure and has
cautioned against its abuse.'2 9 Thus, courts should adhere to the
legislative intent and distinguish real property from personal property in
providing real property owners their fundamental procedural due process
rights. Such a distinction removes real property from the Calero-Toledo
analysis. Given the result of the Tellevik case, the Legislature should
amend the statute to provide an opportunity for a full evidentiary hearing
before the government can deprive an owner of his or her real property.
III. CONCLUSION
By holding that the government's seizure of real property through an
ex parte proceeding complied with the Due Process Clause of the federal
Constitution, the Washington Supreme Court wrongly applied the due
process analysis set forth in previous United States Supreme Court cases,
thus abridging the constitutional rights of real property owners. The
126. Rozner v. Bellevue, 116 Wash. 2d 342, 804 P.2d 24, 26 (1991) (citing 1988 Wash. Laws
1312).
127. Washington Revised Code section 69.50.505(e) provides in pertinent part:
... In cases involving personal property, the burden of producing evidence shall be upon the
person claiming to be the lawful owner or the person claiming to have the lawful right to
possession of the property. In cases involving real property, the burden of producing evidence
shall be upon the law enforcement agency.

128. Id.
129. For example, the Washington Legislature "recognizes that seizure of real property is a very
powerful tool and should not be applied in cases in which a manifest injustice would occur as a
result of forfeiture of an innocent spouse's community property interest." 1989 Wash. Laws 1298.
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court should have read into the forfeiture statute a requirement of notice
and an opportunity to be heard before the government can deprive a
property owner of his or her property. In light of the decision of this
case, the Legislature should amend the statute by inserting a requirement
for an opportunity for a full evidentiary hearing prior to the seizure of
real property.

